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Abstract
I present a generalization of the standard (full-information) model of state-
dependent pricing in which decisions about when to review a ¯rm's existing
price must be made on the basis of imprecise awareness of current market con-
ditions. The imperfect information is endogenized using a variant of the theory
of \rational inattention" proposed by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006). This results in
a one-parameter family of models, indexed by the cost of information, which
nests both the standard state-dependent pricing model and the Calvo model
of price adjustment as limiting cases (corresponding to a zero information cost
and an unboundedly large information cost respectively). For intermediate lev-
els of the information cost, the model is equivalent to a \generalized Ss model"
with a continuous \adjustment hazard" of the kind proposed by Caballero and
Engel (1993a, 1993b), but provides an economic motivation for the hazard
function and very speci¯c predictions about its form. For moderate levels of
the information cost, the Calvo model of price-setting is found to be a fairly
accurate approximation to the exact equilibrium dynamics, except in the case
of (infrequent) large shocks.
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begin work on this project.Models of state-dependent pricing [SDP], in which not only the size of price
changes but also their timing is modeled as a pro¯t-maximizing decision on the part
of ¯rms, have been the subject of an extensive literature.1 For the most part, the
literature dealing with empirical models of in°ation dynamics and the evaluation of
alternative monetary policies have been based on models of a simpler sort, in which
the size of price changes is modeled as an outcome of optimization, but the timing
of price changes is taken as given, and hence neither explained nor assumed to be
a®ected by policy. The popularity of models with exogenous timing [ET] for such pur-
poses stems from their greater tractability, allowing greater realism and complexity
on other dimensions. But there has always been general agreement that an analysis in
which the timing of price changes is also endogenized would be superior in principle.
This raises an obvious question: how much is endogeneity of the timing of price
changes likely to change the conclusions that one obtains about aggregate dynamics?
Results available in special cases have suggested that it may matter a great deal. In a
dramatic early result, Caplin and Spulber (1987) constructed a tractable example of
aggregate dynamics under SDP in which nominal disturbances have no e®ect what-
soever on aggregate output, despite the fact that individual prices remain constant
for substantial intervals of time. Danziger (1999) obtains a similarly stark neutrality
result, again for a special case allowing a closed-form solution, but this time with
idiosyncratic as well as aggregate shocks. The Caplin-Spulber and Danziger exam-
ples are obviously extremely special; but Golosov and Lucas (2007) ¯nd, in numerical
analysis of an SDP model calibrated to account for various facts about the probabil-
ity distribution of individual price changes in U.S. data, that the predicted aggregate
real e®ects of nominal disturbances are quite small, relative to what one might ex-
pect based on the average interval of time between price changes. And more recently,
Caballero and Engel (2007) consider the real e®ects of variation in aggregate nominal
expenditure in a fairly general class of \generalized Ss models," and show that quite
generally, variation in the \extensive margin" of price adjustment (i.e., variation in
the number of prices that adjust, as opposed to variation in the amount by which
each of these prices changes) implies a smaller real e®ect of nominal disturbances
than would be predicted in an ET model (and hence variation only on the \intensive
margin"); they argue that the degree of immediate adjustment of the overall level of
1See, for example, Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Dotsey and King (2005), Gertler and Leahy
(2007), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Midrigan (2008), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a, 2008b)
for some recent additions.
1prices can easily be several times as large as would be predicted by an ET model.2
These results suggest that it is of some urgency to incorporate variation in the
extensive margin of price adjustment into models of the real e®ects of monetary policy,
if one hopes to obtain results of any quantitative realism. Yet there is one respect
in which one may doubt that the results of standard SDP models are themselves
realistic. Such models commonly assume that at each point in time, each supplier
has completely precise information about current demand and cost conditions relating
to its product, and constantly re-calculates the currently optimal price and the precise
gains that would be obtained by changing its price, in order to compare these to the
\menu cost" that must be paid to actually change the price. Most of the time no price
change is justi¯ed; but on the ¯rst occasion on which the bene¯t of changing price
becomes as large as the menu cost, a price change will occur. Such an account assumes
that it is only costs associated with actually changing one's price that are economized
on by ¯rms that change prices only infrequently. Instead, studies such as Zbaracki
et al. (2004) indicate that there are substantial costs associated with information
gathering and decisionmaking that are also reduced by a policy of reviewing prices
only infrequently. If this is true, the canonical SDP model (or \Ss model"), according
to which a price adjustment occurs in any period if and only if a certain adjustment
threshold has been reached, should not yield realistic conclusions. In fact, a model
that takes account of the costs of gathering and processing information is likely to
behave in at least some respects like ET models.3 The question is to what extent
a more realistic model of this kind would yield conclusions about aggregate price
adjustment and the real e®ects of nominal disturbances that are similar to those of
ET models, similar to those of canonical SDP models, or di®erent from both.
The present paper addresses this question by considering a model in which the
timing of price reviews is determined by optimization subject to an information con-
straint, in a dynamic extension of the model proposed in Woodford (2008). The
2An earlier draft of their paper (Caballero and Engel, 2006) proposed as a reasonable \bench-
mark" that the degree of °exibility of the aggregate price level should be expected to be about three
times as great as would be predicted by an ET model calibrated to match the observed average
frequency of price changes.
3Phelps (1990, pp. 61-63) suggests that ET models may be more realistic than SDP models on this
ground. Caballero (1989) presents an early analysis of a way in which costs of information acquisition
can justify \time-dependent" behavior, which is further developed by Bonomo and Carvalho (2004)
and Reis (2006).
2model generalizes the canonical SDP model (which appears as a limiting case of the
more general model, the case of zero information cost) to allow for costs of obtaining
and/or processing more precise information about the current state of the economy,
between the intermittent occasions on which full reviews of pricing policy are un-
dertaken. For the sake of simplicity, and to increase the continuity of the present
contribution with prior literature, it is assumed that when a ¯rm decides to pay the
discrete cost required for a full review of its pricing policy, it obtains full information
about the economy's state at that moment; hence when price changes occur, they
are based on full information, as in canonical SDP models (as well as canonical ET
models).4 However, between the occasions on which such reviews occur, the ¯rm's
information about current economic conditions is assumed to be much fuzzier; and in
particular, the decision whether to conduct a full review must be made on the basis
of much less precise information than will be available after the review is conducted.
As a consequence, prices do not necessarily adjust at precisely the moment at which
they ¯rst become far enough out of line for the pro¯t increase from a review of pricing
policy to justify the cost of such a review.
There are obviously many ways in which one might assume that information
is incomplete, each of which would yield somewhat di®erent conclusions. Here (as
in Woodford, 2008) I adopt a parsimonious speci¯cation based on the concept of
\rational inattention" proposed by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006). It is assumed that all
information about the state of the world is equally available to the decisionmaker |
one does not assume that some facts are more easily or more precisely observable than
others | but that there is a limit on the decisionmaker's ability to process information
of any kind, so that the decision is made on the basis of rather little information.
The information that the decisionmaker obtains and uses in the decision is, however,
assumed to be the information that is most valuable to her, given the decision problem
that she faces, and subject to a constraint on the overall rate of information °ow to
the decisionmaker. This requires a quantitative measure of the information content of
any given indicator that the decisionmaker may observe; the one that I use (following
4The assumption that full information about current conditions can be obtained by paying a
¯xed cost also follows the previous contributions of Caballero (1989), Bonomo and Carvalho (2004),
and Reis (2006); I depart from these authors in assuming that partial information about current
conditions is also available between the occasions when the ¯xed cost is paid. The analysis here also
di®ers from theirs in assuming that access to memory is costly, as discussed further in section 1.2.
3Sims) is based on the information-theoretic measure (entropy measure) proposed by
Claude Shannon (1948).5 The degree of information constraint in the model is then
indexed by a single parameter, the cost per unit of information (or alternatively, the
shadow price associated with the constraint on the rate of information °ow). I can
consider the optimal scheduling of price reviews under tighter and looser information
constraints, obtaining both a canonical SDP model and a canonical ET model as
limiting cases; but the more general model treated here introduces only a single
additional free parameter (the information cost) relative to a canonical SDP model,
allowing relatively sharp predictions.
The generalization of the canonical SDP model obtained here has many similar-
ities with the \generalized Ss model" of pricing proposed by Caballero and Engel
(1993a, 2007) and the SDP model with random menu costs of Dotsey, King and
Wolman (1999). Caballero and Engel generalize a canonical Ss model of pricing by
assuming that the probability of price change is a continuous function of the signed
gap between the current log price and the current optimal log price (i.e., the one
that would maximize pro¯ts in the absence of any costs of price adjustment), and
estimate the \adjustment hazard function" that best ¯ts US in°ation dynamics with
few a priori assumptions about what the function may be like. The model of price-
adjustment dynamics presented in sections 1 and 2 below is of exactly the form that
they assume. However, the \hazard function" is given an economic interpretation
here: the randomness of the decision whether to review one's price in a given period
is a property of the optimal information-constrained policy. Moreover, the model
here makes quite speci¯c predictions about the form of the optimal hazard function:
given the speci¯cation of preferences, technology and the cost of a review of pricing
policy, there is only a one-parameter family of possible optimal hazard functions,
corresponding to alternative values of the information cost. For example, Caballero
and Engel assume that the hazard function may or may not be symmetric and might
equally well be asymmetric in either direction; this is treated as a matter to be de-
termined empirically. In the model developed here, the hazard function is predicted
to be asymmetric in a particular way, for any assumed value of the information cost.
5See, e.g., Cover and Thomas (2006) for further discussion. The appendix of Sims (1998) argues
for the appropriateness of the Shannon entropy measure as a way of modeling limited attention. As
is discussed further in section 1.2, the informational constraint assumed here di®ers from the one
proposed by Sims in the way that memory is treated.
4Caballero and Engel (1999) propose a structural interpretation of generalized Ss
adjustment dynamics (in the context of a model of discrete adjustment of ¯rms' capi-
tal stocks), in which the cost of adjustment by any given ¯rm is drawn independently
(both across ¯rms and over time) from a continuous distribution of possible costs;
Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) [DKW] consider the implications for aggregate
price adjustment and the real e®ects of nominal disturbances of embedding random
menu costs of this kind in a DSGE model with monopolistically competitive pricing.
The predicted dynamics of price adjustment in the model developed here are essen-
tially the same as in a particular case of the DKW model; there exists a particular
distribution for the menu cost under which the DKW model would imply the same
hazard function for price changes as is derived here from optimization subject to an
information constraint.6
However, the present model supplies an alternative interpretation of the random-
ness of adjustment at the microeconomic level that some may ¯nd more appealing
than the idea of random menu costs. Moreover, the present model makes much
sharper predictions than the DKW model; there is only a very speci¯c one-parameter
family of menu-cost distributions under which the DKW model makes predictions
consistent with the information-constrained model. Assumptions that appear com-
pletely arbitrary under the random-menu-cost interpretation (why is it natural to
assume that the menu cost should be i.i.d.?) are here derived as a consequence of
optimization. At the same time, assumptions that might appear natural under the
random-menu-cost interpretation (a positive lower bound on menu costs, or a dis-
tribution with no atoms) can here be theoretically excluded: the optimal hazard
function in this model necessarily corresponds to a distribution of menu costs with
an atom at zero. This has important implications: contrary to the typical predic-
tion of parametric versions of the Caballero-Engel or DKW model, the present model
implies that there is always (except in the limit of zero information cost) a positive
adjustment hazard even when a ¯rm's current price is exactly optimal. This makes
the predicted dynamics of price adjustment under the present model more similar
6Like the DKW model, the present model implies in general that the adjustment hazard should
be a monotonic function of the amount by which the ¯rm can increase the value of its continuation
problem by changing its price. Only in special cases will this allow one to express the hazard as
a function of the signed gap between the current log price and the optimal log price, as in the
\generalized Ss" framework of Caballero and Engel (1993a, 1993b). Section 2, however, o®ers an
example of explicit microfoundations for such a case.
5to those of the Calvo (1983) model than is true of these other well-known gener-
alizations of the canonical SDP model. It also helps to explain the observation in
microeconomic data sets of a large number of very small price changes, as stressed
by Midrigan (2008,7 and increases the predicted real e®ects of nominal disturbances
(for a given overall frequency of price change), for reasons explained by Caballero and
Engel (2007).
In fact, the results obtained here suggest that the predictions of ET models may
be more reliable, for many purposes, than results from the study of SDP models
have often suggested. The Calvo (1983) model of staggered price-setting is derived
as a limiting case of the present model (the limit of an unboundedly large informa-
tion cost); hence this model, often regarded as analytically convenient but lacking in
any appealing behavioral foundations, can be given a fully explicit decision-theoretic
justi¯cation | the quantitative realism of which, relative to other possible speci¯ca-
tions, then becomes an empirical matter. Moreover, even in the more realistic case
of a positive but ¯nite information cost, the model's prediction about the e®ects of
typical disturbances can be quite similar to those of the Calvo model, as is illustrated
numerically below. The present model predicts that the Calvo model will be quite
inaccurate in the case of large enough shocks | large shocks should trigger immedi-
ate adjustment by almost all ¯rms, because even ¯rms that allocate little attention
to monitoring current market conditions between full-scale reviews of pricing policy
should notice when something dramatic occurs | and in this respect it is surely more
realistic than the simple Calvo model. Yet the shocks for which this correction is im-
portant may be so large as to occur only infrequently, in which case the predictions
of the Calvo model can be quite accurate much of the time.
Section 1 characterizes the optimal timing of reviews of pricing policy in a styl-
ized model with a structure similar to that assumed by Caballero and Engel (1993a,
1993b); this analysis extends the model of information-constrained discrete choice
proposed in Woodford (2008) to an in¯nite-horizon dynamic setting. Section 2 then
illustrates the application of this general framework to a speci¯c model of monopo-
listically competitive price-setting with idiosyncratic shocks. Section 3 compares the
7Midrigan (2008) proposes an alternative explanation to the one given here for a positive haz-
ard function when the current price is nearly optimal (see Figure 4 of his paper). The present
model achieves a similar e®ect, without the complication of assuming interdependence between
price changes for di®erent goods.
6numerical predictions of a calibrated version of this model to microeconomic evidence
regarding individual price changes. Section 4 then discusses the implications of the
model for the neutrality of money, and section 5 concludes.
1 Rational Inattention in a Dynamic Model of the
Timing of Discrete Adjustments
Here I present a dynamic extension of the model of information-constrained discrete
adjustment presented (in a one-period context) in Woodford (2008). As in the work
of Caballero and Engel (1993a, 2007), I shall simplify the state space by consider-
ing a \tracking" problem, in which a ¯rm's pro¯ts each period depend only on its
\normalized price,"8 i.e., the di®erence between its log price pt and the current value
of a state variable at outside the ¯rm's control, about which it is only imperfectly
informed. (For example, pro¯ts may depend on the ¯rm's price relative to its cur-
rent unit cost of production. An explicit model of monopolistically competitive price
adjustment with the structure assumed in this section is presented in section 2.)
In this section, I consider the scheduling of price reviews by a single ¯rm. (An
equilibrium with many ¯rms simultaneously making similar decisions is treated in
section 2.) The model is one with a countably in¯nite sequence of discrete dates
(indexed by integers t) at which the ¯rm's price may be adjusted (and at which sales
occur).9 I shall suppose that the ¯rm seeks to maximize the expected value of a
discounted objective function of the form
1 X
t=0
¯
t¼(qt); (1.1)
where qt ´ pt ¡ mt is the ¯rm's (log) normalized price in period t, and single-period
8The de¯nition given here of a stationary optimal policy can be extended in a relatively straight-
forward way to the case in which pro¯ts also depend on other variables, including aggregate state
variables. But the notation is simpli¯ed in this presentation by abstracting from such additional
state variables, and it allows us to obtain a model in which the adjustment hazard is a function
solely of a \price gap," as in the work of Caballero and Engel. It also considerably simpli¯es the
numerical analysis in section 3, as is discussed further in section 4.
9The model could be extended in a reasonably straightforward way to the scheduling of reviews
of pricing policy in continuous time, as in Reis (2006). But discrete time is mathematically simpler
and allows more direct comparison with much of the prior literature on state-dependent pricing.
7pro¯ts are assumed to be given by a function ¼(q) that reaches its unique maximum
at an interior value that can be normalized as q = 0:
Uncertainty about the ¯rm's normalized price results from the random evolution
of the state mt representing market conditions. Again in order to reduce the size of
the state space required to characterize equilibrium dynamics (and again following
Caballero and Engel), I shall assume for the sake of simplicity that this evolves
according to an exogenously given random walk,
mt = mt¡1 ¡ zt; (1.2)
where the innovation zt is drawn independently each period from a probability dis-
tribution with density function g(z): (The sign of the innovation is chosen so that a
positive innovation zt corresponds to an increase in qt.)
1.1 Information Constraints
I shall suppose that the (log) price pt charged by the ¯rm re°ects current and past
information about the evolution of mt in three distinct ways. First, I suppose that the
¯rm reviews its pricing policy only at certain times, rather than constantly. Holding
such a review involves a substantial ¯xed cost, which is the reason that reviews occur
only as discrete events; but when a review is held, payment of the ¯xed cost allows
the ¯rm to collect a great deal of information about market conditions at that time,
on the basis of which the new pricing policy is chosen. Second, between the occasions
on which a review is conducted, the ¯rm charges a price for its product in accordance
with its current pricing policy. The information about current conditions that can
used in the implementation of such a policy | that is, the extent to which pt can
depend on the current state of the world, as opposed to instructions written down at
the time of the last review | is assumed to be quite limited. (This is why it matters
that policy is not more frequently updated.) And third, the decision about whether
to conduct a review of pricing policy is made on the basis of incomplete information
about current conditions. How well the ¯rm's price pt will track variations in mt
depends in general on what one assumes about the amount of information used in
the decision about the scheduling of price reviews, the amount of information obtained
when conducting such reviews, and the amount of additional information that can be
used in implementing the pricing policy chosen as a result of the review.
8The focus of the present paper is the price review decision; hence the information
used in that decision will be considered in detail, while I make extremely simple
assumptions about the available information for the other two purposes. First, I
shall assume that at the time of a price review, payment of the ¯xed cost gives the
¯rm access to full information about the current state of the economy. Hence the new
plan that is chosen is the optimal one under that state of the world, as is commonly
assumed in models with exogenous timing of price reviews, whether these involve
a ¯xed price between reviews (as in the models of Taylor or Calvo) or some more
complex plan (as in the models of Mankiw and Reis, 2002, or Devereux and Yetman,
2003); as well as in models with state-dependent timing of reviews, again whether
these involve a ¯xed price (as in standard menu-cost models) or a more complex plan
(as in the model of Burstein, 2006); and in generalizations of state-dependent pricing
of the kind proposed by Caballero and Engel (1993a, 2007) or Dotsey, King and
Wolman (1999). This assumption not only simpli¯es the analysis of the consequences
of a particular timing for the price reviews, but also allows me to obtain standard
models of price adjustment (both a standard \Ss" model and the Calvo model) as
limiting cases of the model considered here.
Second, I assume that the pricing policies that are implemented between reviews
use no information about the current state of the economy; hence the pricing policy
reduces to a single price that is charged until the policy is reviewed. (Technically,
the zero-information assumption would allow the ¯rm to choose to randomize each
period over a set of prices, as long as the randomization is independent of the current
state; but I assume a single-period pro¯t function ¼(q) such that it is never optimal
to randomize.10) Hence the dynamics of price adjustment in this model are the same
as in a model in which one must pay a \menu cost" to change one's price, and the
menu cost is also the ¯xed cost of obtaining new (complete) information about the
state of the economy on the basis of which to set the new price. However, I prefer to
interpret the model as one in which there are no true menu costs, but only several
types of information costs. For one thing, if one supposes that the price is ¯xed
between reviews of pricing policy owing to a menu cost, there is no very plausible
reason to suppose that the same ¯xed cost should both allow one to change one's
price and to obtain information that one would otherwise not have. Moreover, it is
fairly common in some retail sectors to observe pricing policies which do not involve
10Speci¯cally, ¼(q) is a strictly concave function of a monotonically increasing function of q.
9a single price, but (for example) frequent alternations between two or more prices,
even though the set of prices among which the seller alternates remains unchanged
for many months; such behavior suggests a model in which (i) the pricing policy is
reconsidered only at fairly long intervals, and in which (ii) the pricing policy involves
only a very coarse discrimination among di®erent weeks, so that only a few di®erent
prices are ever charged,11 but the relative insensitivity of the price to changing market
conditions re°ects information costs (inattentiveness) rather than menu costs. While
more complex pricing policies of that sort are not considered in this paper, a model
that allowed for them would represent an interesting extension of the simpler theory
developed here.
It is also important to note that I shall treat awareness of the passage of time
as among the types of information about the current state of the world that may be
costly for the ¯rm. (Given that the information constraints are interpreted as limits
on the attention of the decisionmaker, and not as claims about what it is di±cult
to observe in the world, the fact that it is easy to construct accurate time-keeping
devices is irrelevant to this issue.) This means that when I consider the incomplete
information on the basis of which the review scheduling decision is made, I assume
that a ¯rm may choose to know how long a time has elapsed since its last review, but
that this is information is costly in the same way as other sorts of information about
its current circumstances. My assumption thus di®ers from that of Bonomo and
Carvalho (2004) or Reis (2006), who assume that information about random events
since the last review12 cannot be used in deciding whether to schedule a review,
but that this decision may depend on the length of time that has elapsed since the
last review. Similarly, when I assume that a pricing policy must use no information
about the current state, this means not only that the price charged cannot depend on
11Matejka (2008) shows how an information-°ow constraint can result in a policy that alternates
among a small number of prices.
12What I am calling the dates of \reviews" correspond to the dates at which information is updated
in the model of Reis (2006). Reis's model, however, is equivalent to one in which pricing plans are
chosen at discrete dates (the dates at which information is updated) and followed until the next
information update; under one of these plans, the price charged each period may depend on the
time that has elapsed since the last information update, but not on any random events that have
occurred since information was last updated. The decision about when to update information again
is also allowed to depend on the time that has elapsed since the last update, but not on random
events that have occurred since then.
10unforecastable changes in conditions since the adoption of the policy, but also that
the price cannot depend on the time that has elapsed. In this my assumption di®ers
from both Reis (2006) and Burstein (2006), who allow ¯rms to follow pricing policies
under which the price is a deterministic function of time between reviews, though it
may not depend on any other information about the current state.13
1.2 Rational Inattention
I turn now to the precise speci¯cation of the information used in the scheduling of
reviews of pricing policy. I adopt Sims' (1998, 2003, 2006) hypothesis of \rational
inattention": ¯rms have precisely that information that is most valuable to them,
given the decision problem that they face, subject to a constraint on the overall
quantity of information that they access. Rather than specifying a quantity con-
straint, I assume that there is a cost µ > 0 per unit of information obtained each
period by the decisionmaker, and that the total quantity of information obtained is
the amount that is optimal given this cost.
I assume that the ¯rm can arrange to receive a (possibly multi-dimensional) signal
each period, which may be related in a fairly arbitrary way to the state of the economy
at that time. Let !t 2 ­t denote a complete description of the economy's state
in period t (including the complete history of all disturbances to that date). The
¯rm arranges to receive a signal st drawn from some set S, where the conditional
probability ¼(stj!t) of receiving any given signal is chosen in advance by the ¯rm;
the ¯rm's decision about whether to review its pricing policy in period t is then a
(possibly random) function of the signal st that is received. The cost to the ¯rm per
period of receiving this signal is µI; where I ¸ 0 is the Shannon (1948) measure of
the average information content of the signal, namely the average amount by which
the entropy of the posterior distribution over ­t (after observing the signal st) is less
than the entropy of the ¯rm's prior. Here the entropy measure of the uncertainty
13Note that Burstein's model, like the one proposed here (but unlike the model of Reis), is one in
which it is assumed that pricing plans must use less information than is used in deciding whether
it is time to revise one's plan. (In Burstein's model, the revision decision is state-dependent, while
the plan that is adopted is not.) But I assume that information is more costly than in Burstein's
model, in the case of each of these decisions.
11indicated by a given probability density f over the state space ­t is de¯ned as
¡E[logf(!t)];
where the expectation is under the distribution f. The parameter µ indicates the
degree to which the decisionmaker's attention is scarce, with a higher value of µ
requiring the decisionmaker to economize on attention to a greater extent (and hence
to use less information).
A ¯rst elementary result (Woodford, 2008) is that under an optimal information
structure, the signal st will take only two possible values, and can be interpreted as a
\yes/no" signal as to whether the current period is a good time to review one's pricing
policy. Since the only use of the signal is to decide whether to conduct the review, a
signal that di®erentiates more ¯nely among states will convey redundant information;
and since the more informative signal would have a greater cost (will place a greater
burden on the decisionmaker's attention) without improving the quality of the deci-
sion, it would be ine±cient. Similarly, an optimal price-review policy will necessarily
be a deterministic function of the signal (i.e., a price review is always conducted if
and only if the signal is \yes"); for in the case that arbitrary randomization of the
decision is desired, it is more e±cient to arrange for this by increasing the random-
ness of the signal (lowering its information content and hence its cost), rather than
by randomizing after receiving an unnecessarily informative assessment of market
conditions. This means that an informationally e±cient price-review strategy (where
the design of the signalling mechanism is treated as part of this strategy) can be fully
described by specifying a hazard function ¤t(!t) that indicates the probability of a
price review in any state.
Another elementary result (again see Woodford, 2008) is that an informationally
e±cient strategy will involve signals that convey information only about aspects of
the state that are relevant to the ¯rm's decision problem. In the present problem,
this means that the probability of receiving a given signal s 2 S will depend only on
the current value of qt, and not on prior history or any other aspects of the current
state. Hence the strategy that is followed in any period can be described by a hazard
function ¤t(qt); a measurable function of a single real variable taking values in [0;1];
as in the papers of Caballero and Engel (1993a, 2007).
The information cost of a strategy represented by a hazard function ¤t(qt) depends
on the ¯rm's prior over possible values of qt before the signal st is received. In a
12dynamic model, this depends on the price-review strategy followed by the ¯rm in
earlier periods. (If price reviews are very frequent, the ¯rm should know that it is
unlikely that its normalized price has drifted very far from the value to which it
would have been reset if a price review has occurred in the recent past, while if they
are infrequent, the ¯rm should be much more uncertain about its current normalized
price.) Hence it is necessary to model the consequences of a price-review strategy for
the evolution of the prior.
Under the assumptions summarized above, the normalized price of ¯rm i evolves
according to
qt+1(i) = qt(i) + zt+1 (1.3)
if there is no review of the ¯rm's policy in period t, whereas
qt+1(i) = q
¤
t + zt+1
if ¯rm i reviews its policy in period t. Here qt(i) is the normalized price of ¯rm i in
period t, after realization of the period t change in aggregate nominal expenditure,
but before the decision about whether to review the ¯rm's policy in period t, and q¤
t is
the normalized price (after the review) that is chosen by a ¯rm that reviews its policy
in period t. The value of q¤
t is the same for all ¯rms i because (as is shown below)
the optimal choice for a ¯rm that reviews its policy is independent of the normalized
price that it has at the time of the review; hence if ¯rms di®er only in the periods in
which they happen to have reviewed their prices in the past (despite having followed
identical policies), q¤
t will be the same for all i.
The dynamics of a ¯rm's prior also depend on what we assume about the ¯rm's
memory. In the applications of rational inattention to dynamic decision problems
by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006), memory of the entire history of past signals is assumed
to be perfectly precise (and costless); the information-°ow constraint applies only to
the degree of informativeness of new observations of external reality. Instead, I shall
assume that access to one's own memory is as costly as access to any other source of
information, during the intervals between price reviews, and this includes memory of
the time at which one last reviewed one's pricing policy. For example, one may allow
¯rms to condition their price-review decision on the number of periods n that have
elapsed since the last price review. In this case, the ¯rm has a prior f(q;n) over the
joint distribution of its current normalized price q and the current value of n for that
13¯rm. The ¯rm can learn the value of n and condition its decision on that value, but
this would have an information cost of
¡µ
X
n
fn logfn;
where fn ´
R
f(q;n)dq is the marginal prior distribution over values of n. Assuming
that the unit cost µ of this kind of information is identical to the cost of information
about the value of q, the ¯rm will optimally choose not to learn the current value
of n; since learning the value of n would be of use to the ¯rm only because this
information would allow it to estimate the current value of q with greater precision,
it would always be more e±cient to use any information capacity that it devotes to
this problem to observe the current value of q with greater precision, rather than
bothering to observe the value of n.
In assuming that the cost of information about the ¯rm's memory of its own past
signals is exactly the same as the cost of information about conditions external to
the ¯rm, I am making an assumption that is fully in the spirit of Sims' theory of
rational inattention: rather than assuming that some kinds of information are easily
observable while others are hidden, the cost of any kind of information is assumed
to be the same as any other, because the relevant bottleneck is limited attention on
the part of the decisionmaker, rather than anything about the structure of the world
that obscures the values of certain state variables. This is admittedly a special case,
but it is the assumption that makes Sims' theory such a parsimonious one. It is also
a convenient case to analyze ¯rst, owing to its simplicity.14
In this case, any ¯rm i begins any period t with a prior ft(q) over the possible
values of qt(i). This prior indicates the ex ante distribution of possible values of the
¯rm's normalized price in period t, given the policy followed in previous periods, but
not conditioning on any of the signals received in previous periods, or on the timing
14Interestingly, the literature on informational complexity constraints in game theory has more
often made the opposite choice to that of Sims: it is considered more natural to limit the information
content of a decisionmaker's memory than the information content of her perception of her current
environment. For example, in Rubinstein (1986) and many subsequent papers, it is assumed that a
strategy (in a repeated game) is preferred if it can be implemented by a ¯nite-state automaton with a
smaller number of states; this means, if it requires the decisionmaker to discriminate among a smaller
number of di®erent possible histories of previous play. But while memory is in this sense assumed
to be costly, there is assumed to be no similar advantage of a strategy that reduces the number of
di®erent possible observations of current play among which the decisionmaker must discriminate.
14of previous price reviews. By \the policy" followed in previous periods, I mean the
design of the signalling mechanism, determining the probabilistic relation between
the state and the signal received each period, and the ¯rm's intended action in the
event that any given signal is received, but not the history of the signals that were
actually received or the actions that were taken. Given the discussion above, the
policy followed in period t can be summarized by a hazard function ¤t(q), indicating
the probability of a price review in period t as a function of the normalized price
in that period, and a reset value q¤
t, indicating the normalized price that the ¯rm
chooses if it reviews its pricing policy in period t. As a result of this policy, qt+1(i),
the normalized price in period t + 1 (after realization of the period t + 1 innovation
in aggregate nominal expenditure) will be equal to q¤
t +zt+1 with probability ¤(qt(i))
and equal to qt(i) + zt+1 with probability 1 ¡ ¤(qt(i)); conditional on the value of
qt(i): Integrating over the distribution of possible values of qt(i); one obtains a prior
distribution for period t + 1 equal to
ft+1(q) = g(q
¤
t ¡ q)
Z
¤t(~ q)ft(~ q)d~ q +
Z
g(~ q ¡ q)(1 ¡ ¤t(~ q))ft(~ q)d~ q: (1.4)
This is the prior at the beginning of period t + 1, regardless of the signal received in
period t (i.e., regardless of whether a price review occurs in period t), because the
¯rm has no costless memory.
The right-hand side of (1.4) de¯nes a linear functional T¦t[ft] that maps any
probability density ft into another probability density ft+1; the subscript indicates
that the mapping depends on the policy ¦t ´ (¤t;q¤
t). Given an initial prior f0 and
policies f¦tg for each of the periods t ¸ 0; the law of motion (1.4) implies a sequence
of priors fftg for all periods t ¸ 1: Note that if for any policy ¦; the prior f is such
that
T¦[f] = f; (1.5)
it follows that if a ¯rm starts with the prior f0 = f and implements policy ¦ each
period, the dynamics (1.4) imply that the ¯rm will have prior ft = f in every period.
Thus f is an invariant distribution for the Markov process describing the dynamics of
q under this policy. In such a situation, we can say that the ¯rm's prior each period
corresponds to the long-run frequency with which di®erent values of its normalized
price occur, under its constant policy ¦: When the ¯rm's prior is unchanging over
time in this way, the constant prior makes it optimal for the ¯rm to choose the same
15policy each period, which in turn makes it possible for the prior to remain constant.
In the numerical analysis below, I shall be interested in computing statistics (for
example, the frequency of price changes) for a stationary optimal plan of this kind.
The assumption that memory is (at least) as costly as information about current
conditions external to the ¯rm implies that under an optimal policy, the timing of
price reviews is (stochastically) state-dependent, but not time-dependent, just as
in full-information menu-cost models. When the cost µ of interim information is
su±ciently large, the dependence of the optimal hazard on the current state is also
attenuated, so that in the limit as µ becomes unboundedly large, the model approaches
one with a constant hazard rate as assumed by Calvo (1983). If, instead, memory
were costless, the optimal hazard under a stationary optimal plan would also depend
on the number of periods since the last price review: there would be a di®erent hazard
function ¤n(q) for each value of n. In this case, in the limit of unboundedly large
µ, each of the functions ¤n(q) would become a constant (there would cease to be
dependence on q); but the constants would depend on n, and in the generic case,
one would have ¤n equal to zero for all n below some critical time, and ¤n equal to
1 for all n above it. Thus the model would approach one in which prices would be
reviewed at deterministic intervals, as in the analyses of Caballero (1989), Bonomo
and Carvalho (2004), and Reis (2006). The analysis of this alternative case under the
assumption of a ¯nite positive cost of interim information is left for future work.
1.3 Stationary Optimal Price-Review Policies
We can now state the ¯rm's dynamic optimization problem. Its dynamic price-review
scheduling strategy is a sequence of policies f¦tg for each of the periods t ¸ 0; given
the initial prior f0; each such strategy implies a particular sequence of priors fftg
consistent with (1.4). The strategy is a deterministic sequence, insofar as in each
period, the intended values of ¤t(q) and q¤
t depend only on t, and not on the signals
received by the ¯rm in any periods prior to t, on the timing of its price reviews prior
to t, or on any information collected in the course of those reviews. This is because
of the assumption that memory is costly; even if we imagine that the ¯rm designs
the signalling mechanism for period t and chooses its intended responses to signals in
period t only when that period is reached, it must solve this design problem | which
allows it to choose how much memory to access in period t in making its price-review
16decision | without making use of any memory.15
The ¯rm's objective when choosing this strategy has three terms: the expected
value of discounted pro¯ts (1.1), the expected discounted value of the costs of price
reviews, and the discounted value of the costs of interim information used each period
in that period's price-review decision. The ¯xed cost of a price review is assumed
to be · > 0 in each period t in which such a review occurs; the cost of interim
information is assumed to be µIt in each period t (regardless of the signal received
in that period), where It is the expected information used by a strategy that results
in a hazard function ¤t(q); given the prior ft for that period. In each case, the
information costs are assumed to be in the same units as ¼(qt); and all costs in period
t are discounted by the discount factor ¯
t:
A ¯rm's ex ante expected pro¯ts in any period t can be written as ¹ ¼(¦t;ft), where
¦t = (¤t(q);q¤
t) is the policy followed in period t, ft is the ¯rm's prior in period t
(given its policies in periods prior to t), and
¹ ¼(¦;f) ´
Z
[¤(q)¼(q
¤) + (1 ¡ ¤(q))¼(q)]f(q)dq:
The ex ante expected cost of price reviews in period t can be written as ·¹ ¸(¦t;ft);
where
¹ ¸(¦;f) ´
Z
¤(q)f(q)dq
indicates the probability of a price review under a policy ¦. Finally, the cost of
interim information can be written (as in Woodford, 2008) as µIt = µ¹ I(¦t;ft); where
¹ I(¦;f) ´
Z
'(¤(q))f(q)dq ¡ '(¹ ¸(¦;f)); (1.6)
and '(¤) is the Shannon binary entropy function, de¯ned as
'(¤) ´ ¤log¤ + (1 ¡ ¤)log(1 ¡ ¤) (1.7)
15I assume here that a ¯rm can implement a sequence of policies f¦tg which need not specify the
same policy ¦ for each period t, without using \memory" of the kind that is costly. I assume that
a ¯rm has no di±culty remembering the strategy that it chose ex ante; what is costly is memory
of things that happen during the execution of the strategy, that were not certain to happen ex
ante. Note also that the ¯rm's price-review policy fails to be time-dependent, not because it lacks
a \clock" to tell it the current value of t, but because it cannot costlessly remember whether it
reviewed its pricing policy in any given previous period; it knows the value of t but not the value of
n.
17in the case of any 0 < ¤ < 1, and at the boundaries
'(0) = '(1) = 0:
The ¯rm's problem is then to choose a sequence of policies f¦tg for t ¸ 0 to
maximize
1 X
t=0
¯
t[¹ ¼(¦t;ft) ¡ ·¹ ¸(¦t;ft) ¡ µ¹ I(¦t;ft)]; (1.8)
where the prior evolves according to
ft+1 = T¦t[ft] (1.9)
for each t ¸ 0; starting from a given initial prior f0. A stationary optimal policy is a
pair (f;¦) such that if f0 = f; the solution to the above dynamic problem is ¦t = ¦
for all t ¸ 0; and the implied dynamics of the prior are ft = f for all t ¸ 0: Note
that this de¯nition implies that f satis¯es the ¯xed-point relation (1.5), so that f is
an invariant distribution under the stationary price-review policy ¦.
1.4 A Recursive Formulation
The optimization problem stated above can be given a recursive formulation. This is
useful for computational purposes, and also allows us to see how the problem involves
a sequence of single-period price-review decisions of the kind analyzed in Woodford
(2008). As a result, the characterization given there is both useful in computing the
stationary optimal policy, and helpful in characterizing the random timing of price
reviews of under such a policy.
For any initial prior f0; let J(f0) denote the maximum attainable value of the
objective (1.8) in the problem stated above. Then standard arguments imply that
J(f) must satisfy a Bellman equation of the form
J(ft) = max
¦t
©
¹ ¼(¦t;ft) ¡ ·¹ ¸(¦t;ft) ¡ µ¹ I(¦t;ft) + ¯J(ft+1)
ª
; (1.10)
where ft+1 is given by (1.9). If we can ¯nd a functional J(f) (de¯ned on the space
of probability measures f) that is a ¯xed point of the mapping de¯ned in (1.10),
then this is a value function for the optimization problem stated above. Moreover,
the dynamic price-review scheduling problem can then be reduced to a sequence of
single-period problems: in each period t, the policy ¦t is chosen to maximize the
18right-hand side of (1.10) subject to the constraint (1.9), given the prior ft in the
current period. The policy chosen each period then determines the prior in the next
period through the law of motion (1.9). A stationary optimal policy is then a pair
(f;¦) such that (i) if ft = f; the solution to the problem (1.10) is ¦t = ¦; and (ii)
the distribution f is a ¯xed point (1.5) of the mapping de¯ned by the policy ¦:
This still does not make it easy to compute a stationary optimal policy, as one
must ¯rst compute a functional J(f) that is a ¯xed point of (1.10), and this is far
from trivial, since (1.10) de¯nes a mapping from a very high-dimensional function
space into itself. Nor is the single-period policy problem de¯ned in (1.10) as simple
as the one considered in Woodford (2008). However, we can obtain an even simpler
characterization by observing that J(ft) is necessarily a concave functional, that is
furthermore di®erentiable at ft = f (the invariant distribution under the stationary
optimal policy), so that for distributions ft close enough to f, the value function can
be approximated by a linear functional
J(ft) ¼ J(f) +
Z
j(q)[ft(q) ¡ f(q)]dq;
where j(q) is an integrable function. (Note that the derivative function j(q) is de¯ned
only up to an arbitrary constant, since J(ft) is not de¯ned for perturbations of the
set-valued function ft that do not integrate to 1.) The concavity of J(ft+1) then
implies that ¦t = ¦ solves the problem (1.10) when ft = f if and only if it solves the
alternative problem
max
¦t
½
¹ ¼(¦t;f) ¡ ·¹ ¸(¦t;f) ¡ µ¹ I(¦t;f) + ¯
Z
j(q)[ft+1(q) ¡ f(q)]dq
¾
; (1.11)
where ft+1 is again given by (1.9).
Using (1.9) to substitute for ft+1; the objective in (1.11) can alternatively be
expressed as
(V (q
¤
t) ¡ ·)
Z
¤t(q)f(q)dq +
Z
V (q)(1 ¡ ¤t(q))f(q)dq ¡ µ¹ I(¤t;f); (1.12)
where
V (q) ´ ¼(q) + ¯
Z
j(~ q)g(q ¡ ~ q)d~ q; (1.13)
and I have now written simply ¹ I(¤t;f), to indicate that the function ¹ I de¯ned in
(1.6) does not depend on the choice of q¤. (Here the variable of integration q in
19(1.12) is the normalized price in period t after the period t disturbance to aggregate
expenditure, but before the decision whether to conduct a price review. In (1.13), q
is instead the normalized price that is charged, after any price review has occurred,
while ~ q is the normalized price in the following period, after that period's disturbance
to aggregate expenditure, but before the decision whether to conduct a price review
in that period.) Maximization of (1.12) is in turn equivalent to maximizing
Z
L(q;q
¤
t)¤t(q)dq ¡ µ¹ I(¤t;f); (1.14)
if we de¯ne
L(q;q
¤) ´ V (q
¤) ¡ V (q) ¡ ·: (1.15)
Hence ¦t = ¦ solves the problem (1.10) when ft = f if and only if it maximizes
(1.14).
This, in turn, is easily seen to be true if and only if (i) q¤ is the value of q that
maximizes V (q); and (ii) given the value of q¤; the hazard function ¤ maximizes
(1.14), which can alternatively be written as
Z
[L(x)¤(x) ¡ µ'(¤(x))]f(x)dx + µ'(
Z
¤(x)f(x)dx): (1.16)
As shown in Woodford (2008), the hazard function that maximizes (1.14) must satisfy
the ¯rst-order condition
´ L(x) ¡ µ'
0(¤(x)) + µ'
0(¹ ¤) = 0 (1.17)
almost surely, where
¹ ¤ ´
Z
¤(q)f(q)dq
is the average frequency of reviews of pricing policy. Thus each period a price-review
policy ¦t is chosen that solves a single-period problem identical to the one considered
in Woodford (2008), and in the case of a stationary optimal plan, this problem is the
same each period. However, the de¯nition of this problem involves the function j(q);
thus it may still seem necessary to solve the Bellman equation for the function J(f).
In fact, though, we only need to know the derivative function j(q). And an
20envelope-theorem calculation, di®erentiating (1.10) at ft = f, yields
j(q) = ¤t(q)¼(q
¤
t) + (1 ¡ ¤t(q))¼(q) ¡ µ
·
'(¤t(q)) ¡ '
0
µZ
¤t(~ q)f(~ q)d~ q
¶¸
¡·¤t(q) + ¯
Z
j(~ q)[¤t(q)g(q
¤
t ¡ ~ q) + (1 ¡ ¤t(q))g(q ¡ ~ q)]d~ q
= ¤t(q)[V (q
¤
t) ¡ ·] + (1 ¡ ¤t(q))V (q) ¡ µ
·
'(¤t(q)) ¡ '
0
µZ
¤t(~ q)f(~ q)d~ q
¶¸
= V (q) + ¤t(q)L(q;q
¤
t) ¡ µ
·
'(¤t(q)) ¡ '
0
µZ
¤t(~ q)f(~ q)d~ q
¶¸
= V (q) ¡ µ['(¤t(q)) ¡ '
0(¤t(q))¤t(q)]
= V (q) ¡ µlog(1 ¡ ¤t(q)):
Here the second line uses the de¯nition (1.13) of V (q); the third line uses the de¯nition
(1.15) of L(q;q¤); the fourth line uses the fact noted above that a solution to the
problem (1.11) | and accordingly, a solution to the problem (1.10) | must satisfy
the ¯rst-order condition (1.17) to substitute for L(q;q¤); and the ¯nal line uses the
de¯nition (1.7) of the binary entropy function '(¤): Note also that on each line, I have
suppressed an arbitrary constant term, since j(q) is de¯ned only up to a constant.
Substituting the above expression for j(q) into the right-hand side of (1.13), we
obtain
V (q) ´ ¼(q) + ¯
Z
[V (~ q) ¡ µlog(1 ¡ ¤(~ q))] g(q ¡ ~ q)d~ q; (1.18)
a ¯xed-point equation for the function V (q) that makes no further reference to either
the value function J or its derivative. A stationary optimal policy then corresponds
to a triple (f;¦;V ) such that (i) given the policy ¦; the function V is a ¯xed point
of the relation (1.18); given the pseudo-value function V and the prior f, the policy
¦ is such that q¤ maximizes V and ¤ maximizes (1.16); and (iii) given the policy ¦,
the distribution f is an invariant distribution, i.e., a ¯xed point of relation (1.5).
This characterization of a stationary optimal policy reduces our problem to a
much more mathematically tractable one than solution of (1.10) for the value function
J(f). We need only solve for two real-valued functions of a single real variable, the
functions V (q) and ¤(q); a probability distribution f(q) over values of that same
single real variable; and a real number q¤: These can be solved for using standard
methods of function approximation and simulation of invariant distributions, of the
kind discussed for example in Miranda and Fackler (2002).
212 A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price
Adjustment
Let us now numerically explore the consequences of the model of price adjustment
developed in section 1, in the context of an explicit model of the losses from infrequent
price adjustment of a kind that is commonly assumed, both in the literature on
canonical (full-information) SDP models and in ET models of in°ation dynamics.
The economy consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers of
di®erentiated goods, indexed by i, and in the case considered in this section, I shall
assume that the only shocks to the economy are good-speci¯c shocks, so that there
is no aggregate uncertainty.
Let us suppose that each household seeks to maximize a discounted objective
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t
"
C
1¡¾¡1
t
1 ¡ ¾¡1 ¡ ¸
H
1+º
t
1 + º
#
where
Ct ´
·Z 1
0
(ct(i)=At(i))
²¡1
² di
¸ ²
²¡1
(2.1)
is an index of consumption of the various di®erentiated goods indexed by i, At(i) is a
good-speci¯c shock to preferences, Ht is the hours of labor supplied by the household
(in the sector-speci¯c labor market in which the particular household works), and
the preference parameters satisfy 0 < ¯ < 1; ¾;¸ > 0; º ¸ 0; and ² > 1: Each dif-
ferentiated good is supplied by a monopolistically competitive ¯rm, with production
function
yt(i) = At(i)ht(i)
1=Á:
Here ht(i) indicates the hours of labor employed (of the speci¯c type required for the
production of good i), At(i) is a good-speci¯c productivity factor, and Á ¸ 1: Note
that the good-speci¯c factor At(i) is assumed to shift both the relative preference for
and the relative cost of producing good i. The assumption that the idiosyncratic shock
shifts both preferences and technology in this way is plainly a very special (and rather
arti¯cial) one, but it has the advantage of making the pro¯ts of a ¯rm i a function only
of a single variable, the normalized price of good i (de¯ned below);16 this is convenient
not only because it makes the ¯rm's problem a \tracking problem" of exactly the kind
16Another convenient feature of this assumption is that each ¯rm's pro¯t function is shifted in
22assumed by Caballero and Engel (1993a, 1993b), but because computation is simpler
in the case of a model with a one-dimensional state space. (The analysis proposed
here can easily be extended to the case of separate good-speci¯c shocks to preferences
and technology, with only a modest increase in numerical complexity.)
Except for the assumption of the good-speci¯c shocks fAt(i)g, the model is ex-
actly like the New Keynesian model of monopolistically competitive price adjustment
expounded in Woodford (2003, chap. 3). Each household is assumed to own an equal
share of each of the ¯rms, and households' idiosyncratic income risk (owing to hav-
ing specialized in supplying lebor to a particular sector) is perfectly shared through
insurance contracts, so that households' budgets are all identical in equilibrium, and
their state-contingent consumption plans as well. As a consequence, each household
values random income streams in the same way, and the (nominal) stochastic discount
factor is given by
Qt;T = ¯
T¡t
µ
Ct
CT
¶¾¡1
Pt
PT
;
where Ct is aggregate (and each household's individual) consumption of the composite
good (de¯ned in 2.1) in period t, and Pt is the price of a unit of the composite good.
Each ¯rm i sets prices so as to maximize the discounted value of its pro¯ts using this
stochastic discount factor. This is equivalent to maximization of an objective of the
form
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t~ ¦t(i); (2.2)
where ~ ¦t(i) ´ ¦t(i)C
¡¾¡1
t =Pt; and ¦t(i) is the nominal pro¯t (revenue in excess of
labor costs) of ¯rm i in period t.
The Dixit-Stiglitz preference speci¯cation (2.1) implies that each ¯rm i faces a
demand curve of the form
yt(i) = At(i)
1¡²Yt
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶¡²
(2.3)
for its good, where Pt(i) is the price of good i, Yt is production of (and aggregate
the same way by a shock to aggregate nominal expenditure (considered in section 4 below) as it is
by the idiosyncratic shock; again the pro¯t function is unchanged once the price is appropriately
renormalized.
23demand for) the composite good de¯ned in (2.1), and the price index
Pt ´
·Z
(Pt(i)At(i))
1¡²di
¸ 1
1¡²
(2.4)
indicates the price of a unit of the composite good. Optimal labor supply in each
sectoral labor market implies that the real wage paid by ¯rm i will equal Wt(i)=Pt =
¸ht(i)ºC¾¡1
t : Using this expression for the wage and using the production function
to solve for the labor demand of ¯rm i as a function of its sales, one ¯nds that the
pro¯ts of ¯rm i in period t are equal to
¦t(i) = Pt(i)yt(i) ¡ Wt(i)ht(i)
= Pt(i)yt(i) ¡ ¸PtC
¾¡1
t
µ
yt(i)
At(i)
¶´
;
where ´ ´ Á(1 + º) ¸ 1:
If we de¯ne the normalized price of ¯rm i as
Qt(i) ´
Pt(i)At(i)¹ Y
PtYt
;
where ¹ Y > 0 is a normalization factor (chosen below), and let Qt be the population
distribution of values of Qt(i) across all ¯rms in period t, then it follows from (2.4)
that
Yt = Y (Qt) ´ ¹ Y
·Z
Qt(i)
1¡²di
¸¡1=(1¡²)
:
One can then write the period contribution to the objective (2.2) of ¯rm i as a function
solely of the ¯rm's normalized price Qt(i) and the distribution of normalized prices
Qt,
~ ¦t(i) = ¹ Y
²¡1Y (Qt)
2¡¾¡1¡²Qt(i)
1¡² ¡ ¸¹ Y
´²Y (Qt)
´(1¡²)Qt(i)
¡´²;
using the demand function (2.3) to solve for the ¯rm's sales, and the fact that Ct =
Yt = Y (Qt) in equilibrium.
In the equilibrium discussed in the next section, I assume that there are only
idiosyncratic shocks, and consider only a stationary equilibrium in which the popula-
tion distribution of normalized prices is constant over time. In such an equilibrium,
the decision problem of each individual ¯rm involves an objective of the form (1.1),
where I now de¯ne qt(i) ´ logQt(i): (Note that this is consistent with the de¯nition
in section 1, if we de¯ne mt(i) ´ log(PtYt=At(i)¹ Y ): Note also that, as assumed in
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Figure 1: The normalized pro¯t function ¼(q).
section 1, the evolution of fmt(i)g is outside the control of ¯rm i.) It is convenient,
in reporting the numerical results below, to choose the normalization factor17 ¹ Y so
that
¹ Y =
"
Y ( ¹ Q)(´¡1)(1¡²)+¾¡1¡1
¸¹´
# 1
1+(´¡1)²
;
where ¹ Q is the stationary distribution of normalized prices and ¹ ´ ²=(² ¡ 1) > 1 is
the desired markup factor (under full information) of a ¯rm facing a demand curve
of the form (2.3). In this case, the ¯rm's objective can be written as (1.1), where the
period pro¯t function is given by18
¼(q) ´ Q
1¡² ¡
1
´¹
Q
¡´²: (2.5)
The pro¯t function is thus a member of a two-parameter family of functions
17This is essentially a choice of the units in which output is measured. The point of the proposed
normalization is to make the pro¯t-maximizing normalized price equal to 1.
18This expression for the pro¯t function omits a positive multiplicative factor that is time-invariant
under the assumptions stated in the text. The normalization has no consequences for the optimal
price-review scheduling problem.
25(depending only on the values of ² and ´). Under our maintained assumptions that
² > 1 and ´ ¸ 1; this is necessarily a single-peaked function, reaching its maximum
at the value q = 0: Moreover, the pro¯t function is asymmetric, with pro¯ts falling
more sharply for negative values of q than for positive values of the same size, as
shown in Figure 1. This asymmetry results in an asymmetric hazard function for the
price-review decision, as illustrated in the next section.
For simplicity (i.e., to make the state space as small as possible), I also assume
that the ¯rm-speci¯c factor follows a random walk,
logAt(i) = logAt¡1(i) + zt(i);
where the innovation zt(i) is drawn independently (both across ¯rms i and across
time periods t) each period from a distribution g(z). In section 3 I also assume that
aggregate nominal expenditure PtYt is constant over time (though the consequences
of a disturbance to aggregate expenditure are discussed in section 4). Under this
assumption, the normalized price can be written as qt(i) = pt(i)¡mt(i); where mt(i)
evolves as in (1.2).
Under these assumptions, each ¯rm's price-review scheduling problem is a problem
of the form discussed in section 1. We can then characterize the stationary optimal
price-review policy for each ¯rm as in that section. Associated with the stationary
optimal policy is a long-run frequency distribution f(q) for each ¯rm's normalized
price qt(i), and given the independence across ¯rms of the evolution of qt(i),19 this
distribution f(q) is also the (time-invariant) population distribution ¹ Q of normalized
prices across ¯rms. Note that under the normalization of qt(i) proposed, it is not
necessary to solve for the population distribution in order to solve the individual
¯rm's price-review scheduling problem; however, we do need to solve for ¹ Q in or-
der to determine the (time-invariant) level of equilibrium output in the stationary
equilibrium, and the value of the normalization factor ¹ Y ; in order to interpret the
dynamics of normalized prices in terms of their implications for non-normalized prices
and quantities.20
19Both the innovations zt(i) in the ¯rm-speci¯c factor and the randomness of the signalling mech-
anism used to schedule price reviews (re°ected in the hazard function ¤(q)) are assumed to be
independent across ¯rms i.
20Solution for the optimal price-review policy does require that one specify the information-cost
parameters · and µ in the same units as the normalized pro¯t function ¼(q), and so if one knows
26Table 1: Resource expenditure on information, for values of µ: Each share is measured
in percentage points.
µ s· sµ rµ
0 5.0 0 100
.05 4.5 1.16 56.7
.5 5.2 2.72 9.7
5 9.2 2.11 0.78
50 12.5 0.70 0.03
1 15.0 | 0
3 Dynamics of Individual Prices under the
Stationary Optimal Policy
I now illustrate the implications of the model set out in section 2 for the dynamics of
individual price adjustment to ¯rm-speci¯c disturbances, by numerically computing
the stationary optimal policy under calibrated parameter values that allow the model
to match (at least roughly) certain statistics of microeconomic data sets. In addition
to the functional-form assumptions already stated in section 2, I assume that the dis-
tribution g(z) is N(0;¾2
z): I compute the stationary optimal policy using an algorithm
of the kind described in the Appendix, using numerical parameter values ¯ = 0:9975
(corresponding to a 3 percent annual rate of time preference, on the understanding
that model \periods" represent months), ² = 6 (implying a desired markup of 20
percent), and ´ = 1:5 (consistent with the values Á = 1:5; corresponding to an elas-
ticity of output with respect to the labor input of 2/3, and º = 0; as in a model with
\indivisible labor").
the value of these costs in real (non-normalized) terms, one cannot determine the values of · and µ
required for the calculations described in section 1 without having determined ¹ Q. But if, as below,
one infers the values of · and µ from their implications for the size and frequency of price changes,
rather than from any direct evidence on the size of these costs, then it is not necessary to have
already determined ¹ Q in order to compute the implications of particular values of · and µ for those
statistics. One does have to solve for the implied distribution ¹ Q in order to determine what these
values of · and µ corrrespond to in terms of non-normalized costs.
27The remaining three parameters that must be assigned numerical values | ¾z;·;
and µ | are chosen so that the model's numerical predictions are at least roughly
consistent with microeconomic evidence on individual price changes, as discussed
below in section 3.2. The predictions for three empirical statistics (shown in Table
3) | the average frequency of price changes, the mean size of price change (mean
absolute value of the change in log price), and the fraction of price changes that
are smaller than 5 percent in size | are used to select realistic values for the three
parameters. The baseline parameter values selected on this ground are ¾z = 0:06
(a one-standard-deviation ¯rm-speci¯c shock changes the ¯rm's optimal price by 6
percent), · = 0:5 (the cost of a price review is half a month's revenue), and µ = 5:
In addition to the results for this value of µ; I also present numerical results for a
variety of other values of µ; listed in Table 1, including values both larger and smaller
than the baseline value.21 Because the assumption of a ¯nite positive cost µ of interim
information is the main novelty of the model presented here, it is of particular interest
to explore the consequences of alternative values of this parameter.
Table 1 provides an indication of the magnitude of information costs implied by
various values of µ, showing in each case the implied cost to the ¯rm of inter-review
information collection (i.e., the cost of the information on the basis of which decisions
are made about the scheduling of price reviews), as well as the cost to the ¯rm of price
reviews themselves, both as average shares of the ¯rm's revenue. (These two shares are
denoted sµ and s· respectively.) The table also indicates how the assumed information
used by the ¯rm in deciding when to review its prices compares to the amount of
information that would be required in order to schedule price reviews optimally; the
information used is fraction rµ of the information that would be required for a fully
optimal decision, given the ¯rm's value function for its continuation problem in each
period (which depends on the fact that, at least in the future, it does not expect
to schedule price reviews on the basis of full information). A value of µ = 5, for
example, might seem high, in that it means that the cost per nat of information22 is
5 months of the ¯rm's steady-state revenue. However, under the stationary optimal
21The bottom line of the table describes limiting properties of the stationary optimal plan, as the
value of µ is made unboundedly large, i.e., in the \Calvo limit".
22A \nat" is equal to 1.44 bits (binary digits) of information. The quantity of information is
measured in nats in this paper, as I use natural logarithms (rather than base 2 logarithms) in
de¯ning the entropy measure.
28policy, the ¯rm only uses information each month in deciding whether to review its
pricing policy with a cost equivalent to about two percent of steady-state revenue.
And since this is 0.78 percent of the information that would be required to make a
fully optimal decision (as assumed in standard SDP models), this speci¯cation of the
information cost implies that it would cost less than three times total revenues for the
¯rm to make a fully optimal decision each month.23 This is a substantial cost, but
perhaps not an unrealistic one; ¯rms surely would ¯nd it prohibitively expensive to
be constantly well-enough informed to make a precisely optimal decision each month
about the desirability of a price review.24
An information cost of µ = 5 seems high when expressed as a cost per nat (or cost
per bit) of information, because I allow the signal s to be designed so as to focus on
precisely the information needed for the manager's decision; once I have done so, one
can only explain imprecision in the decisions that are taken under the hypothesis that
the information content of s must be quite small, or alternatively, that the marginal
cost of increasing the information content of the signal s is quite high.25
3.1 The Stationary Optimal Policy under Alternative Costs
of Information
The optimal price-review policy of an individual ¯rm is completely speci¯ed by the
reset value for the normalized price, q¤, and the hazard function ¤(q): (An advantage
of the univariate case considered here is that the hazard is a function of a single real
variable, and can easily be plotted.) Table 2 shows the optimal value of q¤ for a range
23Here I refer to the cost of making a fully optimal decision in one month only, taking for granted
that one's problem in subsequent months will be the information-constrained problem characterized
here, and not to the cost of making a fully optimal decision each month, forever. In Table 1, the
information cost of a fully optimal decision is computed using the value function V (q) associated
with the stationary optimal policy corresponding to the given value of µ:
24Under a more realistic calibration of the model, \periods" should perhaps correspond to weeks
rather than to months, and this would doubtless a®ect the calculations reported in Table 1. Here I
interpret the model \periods" as months because the micro data discussed in section 3.2 are monthly.
25It is important to understand that the parameter µ does not represent a cost-per-letter of having
a sta® member read the Wall Street Journal; it is instead intended to represent a cost of getting
the attention of the manager who must make the decision, once the sta® have digested whatever
large amount of information may have been involved in the preparation of the signal s that must be
passed on to the manager.
29Table 2: The optimal value of q¤ for alternative values of µ.
µ q¤
0 .015
:05 .015
:5 .039
5 .068
50 .067
1 .076
of values for the information cost µ; and Figure 2 plots the corresponding optimal
hazard functions. One observes that q¤ is positive, and by several percentage points
in the case of the larger values of µ. The optimal reset value is positive, even though
it would be optimal to set qt(i) = 0 at all times in the absence of information costs,
due to the asymmetry of the pro¯t function seen in Figure 1. Because the losses
associated with a price that is too low are greater than those associated with a price
that is too high by the same number of percentage points, it is prudent to set one's
price slightly higher than one would if one expected to be able to adjust the price
again immediately in the event of any change in market conditions, in order to reduce
the probability of having a price that is too low. The size of the bias that is optimal
is greater when interim information is costly, but it is still positive even when µ = 0;
for even in that case, prices are not re-optimized continually, owing to the cost · of
price reviews.
In the case that µ = 0; the optimal hazard function has the \square well" shape
associated with standard SDP models: there is probability 0 of adjusting inside the
Ss thresholds, and probability 1 of adjusting outside them. For positive values of µ;
one instead has a continuous function taking values between 0 and 1, with the lowest
values in the case of \price gaps" near zero,26 and higher values in the case of large
price gaps of either sign. When µ is small (though positive), as in the case µ = 0:05
shown in the ¯gure, the hazard function is still barely above 0 for small price gaps,
and rises rapidly to values near 1 for price gaps that are only a small distance outside
26Here I de¯ne the \price gap" as the value of qt(i) ¡ q¤; i.e., the gap between the current log
price and the price that would currently be chosen in the event of a review.
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Figure 2: The optimal hazard function ¤(q), for alternative values of µ.
the \zone of inaction" under full information. But for larger values of µ; the optimal
hazard function is signi¯cantly positive even for price gaps near zero, and increases
only slightly even for price gaps far outside the full-information \zone of inaction".
It is also interesting to observe that for substantially positive (but still ¯nite)
values of µ; the optimal hazard function is quite asymmetric: the probability of a price
review rises much more rapidly in the case of negative price gaps than in the case of
positive price gaps of the same magnitude. In fact, this asymmetry is of the same
sign as has been found to best ¯t U.S. data on both aggregate in°ation dynamics
(Caballero and Engel, 1993a) and on the distribution of individual price changes
(Caballero and Engel, 2006). The present model provides an economic explanation
for the asymmetry for which Caballero and Engel argue on (purely atheoretical)
empirical grounds.
In the limit as µ is made unboundedly large, the optimal hazard approaches a
positive value between zero and one that is independent of the size of the price gap.
(This limiting hazard is shown by the horizontal solid line in the ¯gure, at a hazard
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Figure 3: The invariant distribution f(q), for alternative values of µ.
of approximately 0.3.) The convergence can be seen particularly clearly in the case of
price gaps near zero, where the hazard approaches the limiting value monotonically
from below; convergence similarly occurs for price gaps outside the full-information
Ss thresholds, though in this case the convergence is non-monotonic. Thus in the
limit of very costly interim information, the model predicts behavior like that of the
Calvo model (in which the hazard is a constant positive rate regardless of the price
gap). In fact, already in the case µ = 50; one can see from the ¯gure that the hazard
rate is essentially constant for a large range of normalized prices, corresponding to
price gaps anywhere between negative 20 percent27 and positive 80 percent or more.
The invariant distribution f(q) implied by the optimal policy (¤(q);q¤) is shown
in Figure 3 for each of these same values of µ: The tightness of the range of variation in
normalized prices is fairly similar across the di®erent values of µ; the main di®erence
is that the distributions are shifted slightly to the right in the case of larger values of
27Note that since (according to Table 2) q¤ is equal to 7.6 percent in this case, a price gap of -20
percent corresponds to the value q = ¡:124 in the ¯gure.
32µ; because of the larger positive values of q¤ in these cases. In the case of low values
of µ (for example, as one moves from µ = 0:05 to µ = 0:5), increasing µ increases
slightly the range of variation in the normalized price, as the hazard no longer rises
toward one quite so sharply in the case of price gaps outside the full-information Ss
thresholds; but as µ increases further, the range of variation shrinks again, owing to
the increase in the hazard rate in the case of price gaps within the full-information
Ss thresholds.
Perhaps the most important implication of Figure 3 is that regardless of the size
of µ; a ¯rm's normalized price will much of the time be within an interval between
(roughly) -0.15 and +0.30. This means that it is only the hazard function over that
interval that matters very much for the equilibrium dynamics of prices; in particular,
the degree to which an appropriately calibrated Calvo model will approximate the
equilibrium dynamics depends only on the constancy of the hazard function over
that interval. From this we can see that the Calvo model will be quite a good
approximation in the case of a value of µ equal to 50 or higher. But even for a value
on the order of µ = 5 (our baseline value), the hazard function is fairly constant over
most of this interval, and so the Calvo model should not be too bad an approximation
in this case either.
3.2 Comparison with Data on Individual Price Changes
We have seen that, depending on the value of µ; the present model predicts dynam-
ics of price adjustment like those of an Ss model, like those of the Calvo model, or
like those of a \generalized Ss" model of the kind discussed by Caballero and Engel
(1993a, 1993b). This raises an obvious question: which of these alternative param-
eterizations of the model is more empirically realistic? One way of answering the
question is to compare the extent to which the model's predictions under alternative
parameterizations match the properties of individual price changes in microeconomic
data sets, as summarized in studies like those of Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008), Midrigan (2008), or Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a).
Table 3 displays the values for several key statistics that are predicted by the
calibrated model discussed above, in the case of several alternative values of µ: The
¯rst column indicates the value of ¹ ¤; the average frequency of price reviews (and
hence of price changes). The second column indicates the mean value of the absolute
33Table 3: Predictions regarding the size and frequency of price changes, for alternative
values of µ. (*Probability that j¢pj < :06:)
µ ¹ ¤ E[j¢pj] Pr(j¢pj < :05) K(j¢pj)
Predictions of calibrated model
0 .100 .186 0 1.2
.05 .090 .195 .000 1.3
.5 .104 .160 .145 2.2
5 .184 .105 .341 4.1
50 .250 .089 .397 4.8
1 .301 .081 .421 4.9
BLS data: Klenow-Kryvtsov (2008) `like prices'
.168 .118 .427
Midrigan (2008) calibration `targets'
.24 .12 .28* 4.0
price change j¢pt(i)j in those months in which a price review (and hence a price
change) occurs. The third column indicates the fraction of price changes that are
smaller than 0.05 in absolute value (again, conditional on a price change occurring),
and the fourth column reports the coe±cient of kurtosis for the distribution of price
changes (conditional on a price change occurring).
The ¯nal two rows of the table indicate two di®erent sets of \target" values for
our calibration, deriving from two di®erent types of microeconomic data sets. The
¯rst set of targets are based on the BLS data on individual prices underlying the CPI.
The statistics reported are those given by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) for what they
call \like price" changes, in which a \regular price" for a good is compared to the
previous \regular price" for the good and a \sale price" is compared to the previous
\sale price" for that good, but sale prices and regular prices for the same good are
treated as if they are from price series for separate goods.28 (Klenow and Kryvtsov
28I use these statistics as the target for calibration of the model, under the interpretation that
those goods for which frequent \sale prices" are observed have a pricing policy that involves both a
regular price and a sale price; a review of the pricing policy is indicated when the regular price or
the sale price is changed, but not when the price of the good switches from the regular price to the
34do not report a value for the kurtosis.) The second set of targets are the calibration
targets proposed by Midrigan (2008), on the basis of a summary of evidence from
two di®erent sets of scanner data.
As noted above, the values for ¾z;·; and µ used in the baseline calibration have
been selected so as to make the calibrated model's predictions as close as possible to
the target values for the ¯rst three statistics.29 The statistic among these three that is
most revealing regarding the empirically realistic value of µ is the frequency of small
price changes. When µ = 0; there are no small price changes at all, because every
price change is a movement from a normalized price outside the Ss thresholds to the
optimal normalized price q¤.30 For small positive values of µ, small price changes
continue to be extremely infrequent. But the fraction of small price changes increases
steadily as µ is increased. Nor is the increased fraction of price changes that are
smaller than 5 percent a consequence of a smaller average size of price changes; the
mean average price change is of essentially the same size when µ = 5 as when µ = 0;
and even slightly larger in the case of very large µ (holding ¯xed the values of the
other parameters). At the baseline value of the information cost parameter (µ = 5),
the model predicts that price changes smaller than 5 percent should occur with a
frequency that is still not as large as the frequency reported by Klenow and Kryvtsov
for the BLS data, but that is larger than the frequency reported by Midrigan (2008)
for his scanner data sets.31
Figure 4 displays the complete (stationary) distribution of price changes for each
value of µ; the increased probability mass for small values of q as µ increases is clearly
apparent. The distribution of price changes predicted by the model when µ is small
is quite di®erent from the empirical distributions shown in Midrigan (2008, Figure
sale price.
29I have considered only round numbers for the various parameter values, given that the target
values themselves are not considered to be known with precision.
30This does not mean that is not possible to have price changes of less than 5 percent; by choosing
a value of · that is substantially smaller, it is possible to calibrate the model so that the Ss thresholds
are much closer to q¤ than for the parameters used here. But this would allow us to explain the
existence of a substantial fraction of price changes smaller than 5 percent only by making the mean
absolute price change much smaller than what is observed in the micro data sets.
31The frequency reported on the bottom line of Table 3, 28 percent, is actually the value that
Midrigan reports for the probability of a price change of less than half the mean size, meaning less
than .06. The frequency of price changes less than .05 in size would be somewhat smaller than this
(but is not reported by Midrigan).
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Figure 4: The (unconditional) distribution of individual price changes, for alternative
values of µ.
1). The distributions found in the microeconomic data sets analyzed by Midrigan
are unimodal and leptokurtic, with a higher peak and fatter tails than a normal
distribution with the same variance. In the present model, for all low enough values
of µ the distribution is bi-modal (as in a standard Ss model); for somewhat higher
values of µ; it is unimodal but platykurtic (with a °at peak and thin tails); and it
becomes leptokurtic only for high enough values of µ: In the case of the baseline values
of the other model parameters, the distribution is leptokurtic only if µ is on the order
of 5 (as assumed in the baseline calibration) or higher.
On the basis of the microeconomic evidence, Midrigan suggests a target value of
4 for the coe±cient of kurtosis.32 The last column of Table 3 shows that the present
model predicts a coe±cient of kurtosis (K(j¢pj)) of roughly this magnitude when µ
is equal to 5,33 again suggesting that this is the most empirically realistic magnitude
32Klenow and Kryvtsov do not report a value for this statistic in the BLS data. However, their
Figure 3 shows that the distribution of price changes is leptokurtic in those data as well.
33For an alternative explanation of the observation of a leptokurtic distribution of individual price
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Figure 5: The probability of a price change as a function of time since the previous
price change, for alternative values of µ:
to assume for the interim information costs. Changing the value of other parameters
(such as ·) can change the size distribution of price changes, but does not change
the prediction that the distribution is leptokurtotic only for large enough values of µ;
and while the µ that is \large enough" could be much smaller if we were to assume a
much smaller value of ·; it would remain the case that a value of µ large enough to
make the distribution leptokurtic is large enough to imply price adjustment dynamics
substantially di®erent from those of a standard menu-cost (Ss) model (the µ = 0 case),
and instead fairly similar to those implied by a Calvo model (the µ ! 1 limit).
Another feature of data on individual price changes that Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) use to discriminate among alternative models of price adjustment is the hazard
for price adjustment as a function of the time elapsed since the last price change. Fig-
ure 5 shows the duration dependence of the adjustment hazard in simulations of the
changes, see Midrigan (2008).
37stationary optimal price-review policy implied by the present model, for alternative
values of µ (but again ¯xing all other parameters at their baseline values). In the case
that µ = 0 (the standard menu-cost model), there is essentially zero probability of
another price change immediately following a price change (since qt(i) is equal to q¤
immediately after any price change), while the probability of a price change is sharply
rising with durations between zero and six months. For small enough positive values
of µ (such as the value µ = 0:5 shown in the ¯gure), the hazard continues to be sharply
rising with duration for the ¯rst few months. But for values of µ on the order of 5
or more, the probability of another price change in the ¯rst month following a price
change is nearly as high as the probability in any of the later months; the hazard as
a function of duration is nearly °at.
In fact, according to the statistics reported by Klenow and Kryvtsov for the
BLS data from the top three urban areas (see their Figure 6), once one corrects
for heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes in di®erent types of goods, the
hazard rate as a function of duration is very nearly °at over durations ranging from
one to eleven months.34 Klenow and Kryvtsov do report a substantial spike in the
probability of a price change after exactly 12 months, but no increases in the hazard
over the range of durations for which the hazard is steeply increasing for the models
with low µ;35 nor is the increased hazard at 12 months an increase for all longer
durations | the hazard is higher for durations of exactly 12 months than for either
shorter or longer durations. This suggests possible time-dependence of the scheduling
of price reviews, but is not consistent with a state-dependent pricing model with small
information costs.36
Thus we once again conclude that information costs on the order of µ = 5 (if not
even higher) are most consistent with the microeconomic evidence regarding the size
and frequency of individual price changes. One observes (from Figure 2) that this size
of information costs implies quite di®erent dynamics of price adjustment than those
34Actually, they note a small decline in the hazard from the one-month duration to durations of
two months or more.
35Klenow and Kryvtsov count this as a problem for standard Ss models.
36The fact that the spike is at precisely 12 months suggests that the reason is not that the
likelihood of a price review depends on elapsed time since the last review in some sectors, but rather
that in at least some sectors, there is signi¯cant seasonality of demand and/or costs; or alternatively,
that it is less costly to condition the price review decision on the month of the year than on other
sorts of information.
38of a standard (full-information) Ss model. Indeed, the hazard function is predicted
to be quite °at, except in the case of quite large negative values of the normalized
price (\price gaps" more negative than -.20). This suggests that the real e®ects of
nominal disturbances under a realistic calibration may be closer to the predictions of
the Calvo model than those of standard SDP models. I examine this question further
in the next section.
4 Monetary Non-Neutrality: A Simple Approach
What are the consequences of these results for the issue raised in the introduction,
namely, whether endogenous timing of price reviews substantially reduces the real
e®ects of monetary disturbances, relative to the prediction of an ET model with the
same average frequency of price reviews? Because there are no aggregate shocks
(and hence no monetary disturbances, among others) in the stationary equilibrium
characterized in the previous section, the present model cannot, strictly speaking,
give an answer to this question. Of course, the model could be extended, in a fairly
straightforward way, to include aggregate nominal disturbances. But in this case,
the distribution of normalized prices would no longer be constant over time, and
the state space for each ¯rm's decision problem would include a description of the
current distribution Qt. For this reason, an exact model with aggregate disturbances
would involve a state space of vastly higher dimension than in the case treated above,
even if the dynamics of aggregate nominal expenditure are assumed to be extremely
simple (for example, a random walk). This means that a proper treatment of the
extension would require the introduction of approximation techniques di®erent from
any required in this paper, and such an analysis is deferred to another study.
Nonetheless, a simple exercise using the results computed above can give an in-
dication of the degree to which the introduction of information costs changes the
conclusions with regard to monetary non-neutrality relative to those obtained from a
correspondingly parameterized full-information SDP model. Let us suppose that an
exogenous shift in the log of aggregate nominal expenditure occurs, with the conse-
quence that the normalized price of each ¯rm i is shifted by the same amount, but
that each ¯rm's price-review decision is a®ected by this in the same way as in the
stationary equilibrium with only idiosyncratic shocks. That is, I shall assume that
each ¯rm's price-review decision is based on a signalling mechanism that would be
39optimal under the assumption that aggregate disturbances never occur, though I am
considering the consequences of an occurrence (at least once) of such a disturbance.
While this involves a hypothesis of inattention that cannot be called fully \rational",
the particular form of bounded rationality that is assumed may not be extremely
implausible, given that under a realistic parameterization, typical aggregate nominal
disturbances will be quite small relative to the idiosyncratic disturbances assumed in
the calibrated model above.37
In fact, the simple exercise su±ces to answer some questions about what one
should expect to occur in the case of a genuinely constrained-optimal information
structure. I consider the consequences of having each ¯rm follow a policy that would
be optimal in the case that the aggregate disturbances had no e®ect on the population
distribution of normalized prices Qt.38 But in the case of monetary neutrality, as
in the examples of Caplin and Spulber (1987) or Danziger (1999), this is true: an
aggregate nominal disturbance has no e®ect on Qt, even though many individual
prices do not change in response to the shock. Hence if a similar neutrality result
were to obtain in the extension of the present model to include aggregate shocks, the
approximation proposed in this section would involve no inaccuracy. It follows that
if the simple calculation shows that monetary neutrality does not obtain despite the
endogeneity of the timing of price reviews, one can be certain that this would also be
true of a model with a genuinely constrained-optimal information structure, though
the degree of non-neutrality might well be di®erent in the more sophisticated model.
Moreover, one can be fairly sure about the sign of the bias resulting from the
simplifying assumption. In the case of a parameterization of the model of monopo-
listic competition that (as here) implies strategic complementarity among the pricing
decisions of ¯rms, the fact that ¯rms are assumed to behave in a way that would
be optimal if the nominal disturbance did not change the distribution of other ¯rms'
37Alternatively, the results presented in this section can be interpreted as optimal behavior under
the assumption that each ¯rm's objective is given by (1.1) with a period pro¯t function given by (2.5),
even if this form of objective can no longer be exactly justi¯ed by the microeconomic foundations
proposed in section 2.
38To be precise, the policy would be optimal if the parameter ¾z is set to re°ect the standard
deviation of innovations in the factor mt due to both idiosyncratic and aggregate disturbances, and
not just the innovations in the ¯rm-speci¯c factor log At(i): But since most of the variance of the
innovations in mt would be due to the idiosyncratic factor in any event, this correction to the above
characterization of the optimal stationary policy would be a very small one.
40normalized prices | when in fact other ¯rms' normalized prices are lowered (on aver-
age) by an increase in aggregate nominal expenditure | means that we are neglecting
a reason why it should be optimal for ¯rms to be less inclined to raise their prices
in response to an increase in aggregate expenditure than is indicated by the simple
calculation here. Hence the simple calculation (which, in essence, abstracts from the
e®ects of strategic complementarity) is surely biased in the direction of indicating
more complete adjustment of prices (and hence smaller real e®ects) than would occur
in the more sophisticated model, under a given parameterization.
Finally, while ignoring the way in which the dynamics of the aggregate distribution
of normalized prices should a®ect the individual ¯rm's decision problem introduces
a bias into our estimate of the degree of monetary non-neutrality, it is not obvious
that it should bias our conclusions about the degree to which the Calvo model (with
its exogenous timing of price reviews) under-predicts the e®ective °exibility of prices.
For abstracting from the consequences of strategic complementarity also biases the
conclusions obtained with regard to monetary neutrality in the case of the Calvo
model.39
Thus in the exercise considered here, I suppose that each ¯rm's price-review policy
continues to be described by the pair ¦ ´ (¤;q¤) that represent a stationary optimal
policy in the case that only idiosyncratic disturbances exist, but I replace the law of
motion (1.3) with
qt+1(i) = qt(i) + zt+1(i) ¡ ºt+1;
where zt+1(i) is drawn independently for each ¯rm from the distribution g(z) as
before, but the additional term ºt+1 represents an unexpected permanent change in
logPt+1Yt+1 relative to the value of logPtYt: The question that we wish to address is
the extent to which such an aggregate shock changes the average level of prices as
opposed to aggregate real activity.
A quantity of interest is therefore
h(º) ´ Ei[¢pt+1(i)jºt+1 = º];
the average price increase resulting from an innovation of size º in aggregate nominal
39The results presented below for the \Calvo model" refer to a model in which the timing of price
reviews is exogenous, but in which ¯rms that review their prices seek to maximize the approximate
objective described by (1.1) and (2.5), rather than the correct objective for the model of monopolistic
competition with aggregate disturbances.
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Figure 6: The function h(º), for alternative values of µ. The dashed line on the
diagonal shows the benchmark of perfect neutrality.
expenditure. I assume that the population distribution of values of qt+1(i) prior to
the aggregate shock is given by the stationary distribution ¹ Q computed above for the
case in which only idiosyncratic shocks exist.
There are two simple benchmarks with which it is useful to compare the function
h(º) obtained for the model with information-constrained price review decisions. One
is the benchmark of perfect neutrality. In this case (represented, for example, by the
SDP models of Caplin and Spulber or Danziger), h(º) = º; a straight line with a
slope of 1. Another useful benchmark is the prediction of the Calvo model of price
adjustment, when calibrated so as to imply an average frequency of price change
equal to the one that is actually observed, ¹ ¤: In this case, h(º) = ¹ ¤º; a straight line
with a slope ¹ ¤ < 1:40
Figure 6 plots the function h(º); for each of the several possible values of µ con-
40For each ¯rm i that reviews its price in period t + 1; the log price change is equal to dt+1(i) ´
q¤ ¡ qt(i) ¡ zt+1(i) + ºt+1; where here qt(i) means the ¯rm's normalized price after any period t
preview. In the Calvo model, a fraction ¹ ¤ of the ¯rms review their prices, and these represent a
uniform sample from the population of ¯rms, so that the mean log price change is ¹ ¤Eidt+1(i): The
Calvo model further implies that Eiqt(i) = q¤; so that Eidt+1(i) = ºt+1:
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Figure 7: A closer view of the function h(º), for the case µ = 0. The dashed line
shows the prediction of the Calvo model for purposes of comparison.
sidered in Table 1. The ¯gure also plots the benchmark of full neutrality (shown as
a dashed line on the diagonal).41 One observes that in all cases, there is less than
full immediate adjustment of prices to a purely monetary shock, in the case of small
shocks (0 < h(º) < º for small º > 0; and similarly º < h(º) < 0 for small º < 0).
However, there is greater proportional adjustment to larger shocks, and in fact in
each case the graph of h(º) eventually approaches the diagonal (the benchmark of
full neutrality) for large enough positive shocks. The size of shocks required for this
to occur, though, is greater the larger is µ: There is also an evident asymmetry in the
responses to large shocks, in the case of ¯nite positive values of µ; there need not be
a full immediate adjustment of the average price to the nominal disturbance even in
the case of very large negative shocks.42 This is because in the model of monopolistic
41The Calvo benchmark cannot be plotted as any single line in this ¯gure, as it depends on the
value of ¹ ¤; and the value of ¹ ¤ is di®erent for the di®erent values of µ; as shown in Table 4.
42Of course, it is hard to be sure how much weight to attach to this result, given that the
approximation involved in neglecting the e®ects of the aggregate shock on the population distribution
43competition proposed above, losses are bounded no matter how much too high one's
price may be, whereas unbounded losses are possible in the case of a price that is too
low.
Even in the case of shocks of a magnitude that does not result in full adjustment
in either case, a positive shock results in more nearly complete price adjustment,
on average, than does a negative shock of the same size. This is a direct result of
the asymmetry of the optimal hazard function, already noted in Figure 3. (Because
¯rms with prices that are too low are more likely to immediately adjust their prices
than ¯rms with prices that are too high, more adjustment occurs immediately in
response to a positive shock than to a negative shock.) The result implies, in turn,
that the e®ects of a contraction of nominal aggregate demand on real activity will be
greater than the e®ects of an expansion of nominal aggregate demand by the same
number of percentage points; for more of the positive demand disturbance will be
dissipated in an immediate increase in prices than occurs in the case of a negative
disturbance. This conclusion, of course, echoes a feature often found in old-fashioned
Keynesian models, which assumed that prices (or wages) were \downwardly rigid" but
not upwardly rigid to the same extent. The present model justi¯es similar behavior
as a consequence of optimization; but the reason here is not any resistance to price
declines | instead, ¯rms are more worried about allowing their prices to remain too
low than they are about allowing them to remain too high.
Even in the case of small shocks, while there is not full adjustment to monetary
shocks in the month of the shock, the average price increase is many times larger
than would be predicted by the Calvo model, in the case of su±ciently small values
of µ: Figure 7 shows a magni¯ed view of the graph of h(º) for small values of º; in
the case µ = 0; with the prediction of the Calvo model also shown by a dashed line.
The slope of the curve h(º) near the origin is several times greater than ¹ ¤; the slope
predicted by the Calvo model. This con¯rms the ¯nding of authors such as Golosov
and Lucas (2007) about the consequences of SDP under full information.
However, for larger values of µ; the Calvo model provides quite a good approxima-
tion, in the case of small enough shocks. Figure 8 shows a similarly magni¯ed view
of the graph of h(º) in the case µ = 5: One observes that the prediction of the Calvo
of normalized prices (when deriving the price-review policies of the individual ¯rms) is particularly
unappealing in the case of a very large negative shock.
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Figure 8: A closer view of the function h(º), for the case µ = 5. The dashed line
again shows the prediction of the Calvo model.
model is quite accurate,43 for shocks of the magnitude shown in the ¯gure. In fact,
these shocks (up to half a percent innovation in the long-run forecast of the price
level, in a single month) are quite large relative to typical nominal disturbances in
an economy like that of the US. So while the Calvo model is much less accurate in
its predictions about large nominal disturbances (especially, large positive shocks),
as shown in Figure 6, in the case that µ = 5 one should expect its predictions to be
reasonably accurate in the case of most of the shocks that occur with any frequency.
For even larger values of µ, the approximation is even better, and the range over
which the approximation is accurate extends to even larger shock sizes.
One way of measuring the extent to which the inaccuracy of the Calvo approxima-
tion matters in general is by considering the slope of a linear regression of the log price
change on the size of the current aggregate shock. Suppose that aggregate nominal
disturbances ºt+1 occurs in each of a large number of periods, drawn independently
43Note that this is a di®erently parameterized Calvo model than in Figure 7: the frequency of
price review in the Calvo model is adjusted to match the higher average frequency of price reviews
¹ ¤ in the model with µ = 5:
45Table 4: The coe±cient ¯ from a regression of log price changes on the current
monetary shock, for alternative values of µ: The value of ¹ ¤ implied by the stationary
optimal policy in each case is shown for purposes of comparison. (Both quantities
reported in percentage points.)
µ ¹ ¤ ¯
0 10.0 45.3
.05 9.0 40.3
.5 10.4 25.2
5 18.4 22.0
50 25.0 25.5
1 30.1 30.1
each time from a distribution N(0;¾2
º), and that each time price-review decisions are
made in the way assumed above. Suppose that we collect data on individual price
changes in each of these periods, and then approximate the function h(º) by a linear
equation,
¢pt+1(i) = ® + ¯ºt+1 + ²t+1(i);
where the residual is assumed to have mean zero and to be orthogonal to the aggregate
shock.44
The values of ¯ obtained from simulations of the stationary optimal policies cor-
responding to the di®erent values of µ are given in Table 4, which also reports the
values of ¹ ¤ implied by each of these policies. (In these simulations I use the value
¾º = :001: This corresponds to a standard deviation for quarterly innovations in the
long-run price level of approximately 17 basis points.) One observes that the Calvo
model under-predicts the °exibility of prices very substantially in the full-information
case (µ = 0), which is to say, in a standard SDP model of the kind studied by Golosov
and Lucas (2007). For the parameter values assumed here, I ¯nd that the correct
linear response coe±cient is more than 4.5 times as large as the one predicted by
the Calvo model. But in the baseline case (µ = 5), the correct coe±cient is only
20 percent larger than the prediction of the Calvo model. The Calvo model is even
44Here I imagine that and estimate the coe±cients ® and ¯ by ordinary least squares. Under the
full neutrality benchmark, ¯ would equal 1; the Calvo model predicts that ¯ should equal ¹ ¤:
46more accurate if information costs are larger; for example, if µ = 50; it under-predicts
the immediate price response by only 2 percent. In the limiting case of unboundedly
large µ; the Calvo model is perfectly accurate.
Further work will be required to determine the degree to which similar conclusions
obtain if one allows ¯rms to be informed to an optimal extent about both idiosyncratic
and aggregate disturbances, taking into account the ex ante joint distribution of both
kinds of disturbances. However, the convergence of the optimal hazard function to a
constant function (i.e., the prediction of an appropriately calibrated Calvo model) as
µ is made unboundedly large should still occur, even in the case of a much larger state
space, for the same reason that it occurs here in the model with only idiosyncratic
shocks. Hence one expects to ¯nd, even in a more sophisticated model, that the
Calvo model becomes a good approximation in the case of high enough values of µ
(especially for small aggregate disturbances); the only question is the exact rate at
which this convergence occurs.
5 Conclusion
I have presented a model in the timing of price changes results from optimizing be-
havior on the part of ¯rms subject to a ¯xed cost of conducting a review of existing
pricing policy. Standard models of state-dependent pricing, however, are generalized
by assuming that a ¯rm's policy with regard to the timing of price reviews is designed
to economize on the cost of being continuously informed about market conditions dur-
ing the intervals between full-scale reviews. The introduction of interim information
costs softens the distinction, emphasized in prior contributions, between the dynamics
of price adjustment in models with exogenous timing of price adjustments and models
with state-dependent pricing, by attenuating both the \selection e®ect" emphasized
by Golosov and Lucas (2007) and the relative importance of the \extensive margin
of price adjustment" emphasized by Caballero and Engel (2007). In the limiting
case of su±ciently large interim information costs, the predicted dynamics of price
adjustment are identical to those of the Calvo (1983) model of staggered price-setting.
At a minimum, this result means that there is no reason to regard the predictions
of (full-information) \menu cost" models as more likely to be accurate than the
predictions of the Calvo model, simply on the ground that the former models have
¯rmer foundations in optimizing behavior. Both models appear as nested (extreme)
47cases of the more general model presented here, so that the question of which special
case is more reliable as an approximation is a quantitative matter, rather than one
that can be settled simply on the basis of the appeal of optimizing models.
The illustrative calculations presented in section 4 furthermore suggest that a
model with interim information costs of moderate size may imply aggregate behavior
fairly similar to that predicted by the Calvo model, and quite di®erent from that pre-
dicted by a full-information menu-cost model. Further work is needed to investigate
to what extent this conclusion obtains when the endogenous information structure
takes account of the ex ante possibility of aggregate as well as idiosyncratic shocks.
But these calculations show that it is possible for predictions of the Calvo model to
be fairly accurate for many purposes | predicting the aggregate responses to dis-
turbances of the magnitude that occur at most times | in a model that does not
possess certain features of the Calvo model that are often argued to be implausible.
In particular, the model with a ¯nite positive interim cost of information does not
imply that prices are equally unlikely to be adjusted even when a given ¯rm's price
happens over time to have become far out of line with pro¯t maximization, or even
when very large disturbances a®ect the economy. However, because ¯rms are in these
situations only very infrequently, the predictions of the Calvo model may nonetheless
be relatively accurate much of the time.
It is important to note, however, that the implications of the present model are
likely to di®er from those of the Calvo model in important respects, even if a rela-
tively large value of µ is judged to be empirically realistic. First, even if the price
adjustments predicted by this model are similar to those of the Calvo model under
all but extreme circumstances, the model's predictions under extreme circumstances
may be of disproportionate importance for calculations of the welfare consequences
of alternative stabilization policies, as argued by Kiley (2002) and Paustian (2005).
And second, even in the limit of an unboundedly large value of µ (so that no interim
information is available at all), the present model's predictions di®er from those of
the Calvo model in at least one important respect: the equilibrium frequency of price
review ¹ ¤ is endogenously determined, rather than being given exogenously. In partic-
ular, the value of ¹ ¤ is unlikely to be policy-invariant; for example, one would expect it
to be higher in the case of a higher average in°ation rate, as in the generalized Calvo
model of Levin and Yun (2007). For this reason as well, the present model may well
have di®erent implications than the Calvo model for the welfare ranking of alternative
48policy rules, as in the analysis of Levin and Yun. This is another important topic for
further study.
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